This study examines whether the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as a consent‑based adjudicatory body, is inherently ill‑suited to respond to global crises. Drawing on three contemporary proceedings under the Genocide Convention—The Gambia v Myanmar, Ukraine v Russian Federation, and South Africa v Israel—the analysis evaluates how State consent simultaneously enables and constrains the Court’s jurisdiction, remedial authority, and capacity to influence unfolding emergencies. The study identifies recurring patterns across the cases: reliance on compromissory clauses as the primary jurisdictional gateway; a necessarily narrow judicial focus limited to treaty‑based obligations; the centrality of provisional measures as the Court’s most immediate crisis‑response tool; and persistent challenges of non‑compliance. At the same time, the Court’s jurisprudence demonstrates a willingness to interpret consent‑based instruments in ways that preserve access, articulate authoritative legal standards, and facilitate the collective enforcement of community interests through doctrines such as erga omnes partes. These developments allow the analysis to test whether the ICJ’s crisis‑response capacity depends primarily on the legal structure of the Genocide Convention or on the political posture and consent practices of the respondent States.